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Theme: This ARI deals with the key decisions on strategic priorities to be adopted by the 
new Australian Labor Government. 
 
 
Summary: The Australian Labor Party came into power in November 2007 after a decade 
of shadow responsibilities on strategic matters. Now in power, its ‘more of the same’ 
approach to security and defence promised during the elections is facing new challenges. 
Some of the key ministers are almost newcomers to the strategic community and they will 
have to manage a controversial divide between those supporting a return to traditional 
defence priorities and those in favour of continuing the shift towards a broader security 
policy. The design of a new strategic policy is a demanding task that requires the 
definition and ‘operationalising’ of a new agenda. 
 
This ARI deals with the key decisions to be adopted by the new Australian Labor 
Government regarding the orderly withdrawal of Australian ground forces from Iraq in 
2008, the production of a new White Paper on Defence –and perhaps National Security 
as well–, strategic and procurement priorities, the Australia-US relationship and the 
tensions between Australia’s global and regional roles. 
 
 
Analysis: In recent years, a variety of controversies have roiled the waters of Australian 
strategic thinking, as commentators have disputed –often vehemently– the proper focus of 
national strategic effort. Those controversies have been especially heated in relation to 
strategic policy, guidance for capability development and defence procurement.1 To some 
extent, arguments are inevitable about such topics: they reflect the internal debates that 
all polities have about strategic priorities and how best to address them. But the intensity 
of the recent debates in Australia increases the need for the current government to spell 
out its priorities, declaratory strategy and capability preferences. 
 
                                                 
* Program Director (Strategy and International), Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
1 Readers unfamiliar with the broad contours of Australia’s recent strategic debates might usefully browse 
some of the following references: Allan Gyngell (2006), Balancing Australia’s Security Interests, Lowy 
Institute, Sydney; Christian Hirst (2007), ‘The Paradigm Shift: 11 September and Australia’s Strategic 
Reformation’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 61, 2, p. 175-192; Peter Cosgrove (2005-06), ‘A 
Perspective on Australian Grand Strategy’, Australian Army Journal, 3, 1, p. 17-28; Rod Lyon (2007), 
Australia’s Strategic Fundamentals, Special Report (6), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra; Hugh 
White (2006), Beyond the Defence of Australia: Finding a New Balance in Australian Strategic Policy, Lowy 
Institute, Sydney; Alan Dupont (2005), Grand Strategy, National Security and the Australian Defence Force, 
Lowy Institute, Sydney; Paul Dibb (2003), ‘Does Australia Need a New Defence Policy?’, Blake Dawson 
Waldron Public Policy Lecture, National Museum of Australia, 22 July; Richard Brabin-Smith (2005), The 
Heartland of Australia’s Defence Policies, SDSC Working Paper nr 396, Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, ANU; Michael Evans (2005), The Tyranny of Dissonance: Australia’s Strategic Culture and Way of 
War 1901-2005, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Canberra. 
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The time to do so is certainly ripe. In November 2007, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) 
swept to victory in Australia’s federal election. Out of power since March 1996, the centre-
left ALP spent much of the election campaign attempting to neutralise the centre-right 
Coalition government’s traditional strengths on economic and national security issues, 
essentially by promising ‘more of the same’. Its most publicised element of differentiation 
lay in a commitment to withdraw Australian ground forces from southern Iraq during 2008. 
But even then, ALP leaders wanted to reassure voters that the withdrawal would be 
structured and orderly, and conducted after close consultations with Australia’s partners in 
Iraq. Further, they confirmed that they would maintain a substantial level of Australian 
military engagement in the broader Iraqi theatre. 
 
Now in power, Labor ministers have found that the real problems begin. The new 
government faces a range of difficult challenges –many of them the challenges the former 
government would have faced had it been returned–. True, ministers are still reading their 
way into their new portfolios, and it is not yet clear how they propose to address particular 
problems. But continuing to offer ‘more of the same’ in the defence portfolio –Labor’s 
election position– does not actually look like a good idea. Rather, the new government will 
have ample opportunity to put more of its own stamp on defence issues, by spelling out 
what it sees as Australia’s strategic priorities, and saying how it intends to pursue them. 
 
New Leaders 
The key figures in the security portfolios for the new government are highly capable 
people, but relatively unknown quantities within their specific areas of responsibility. Joel 
Fitzgibbon, the new Minister of Defence, is relatively new to the defence area: he was 
appointed shadow Minister for Defence only in December 2006, after Kevin Rudd won the 
party leadership. His previous shadow ministry appointments had straddled a range of 
responsibilities, including small business, tourism, resources, mining, energy and forestry, 
treasury, finance, and banking and financial services, but the defence appointment was 
his first real foray into a security-related portfolio. He has a large and difficult portfolio to 
master. Stephen Smith, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, is similarly mastering a large 
and complex portfolio. His previous shadow minister appointments –trade, resources and 
energy, communications and immigration– also signal that the foreign affairs appointment 
is his first real foray into a security-related portfolio. 
 
The Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, is better known for his foreign affairs background –and 
his mastery of Mandarin– than for his defence credentials. But he looks likely to do much 
to shape the new government’s policies in both defence and foreign affairs. Before he 
assumed the mantle of party leader, he was the shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and International Security, and so will bring to the cabinet table considerably 
greater expertise in the national security area than other ministers. 
 
Moreover, Fitzgibbon cannot be indifferent to the lessons of history about the fate of 
previous Defence Ministers, and must contemplate his own future with some anxiety. After 
all, the Howard government burned through five Defence Ministers (McLachlan, Moore, 
Reith, Hill and Nelson) during its 11 and a half years in office. The portfolio is a 
demanding one and has typically proved a graveyard for aspiring political figures. Since 
the Whitlam government in early 1970s, only one Defence Minister (Kim Beazley) has 
ever moved on to another ministerial appointment. And few have ever seemed 
comfortable with their responsibilities in relation the large, sprawling department that 
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Defence has become.2 So, for at least the first six to 12 months, the new government is 
likely to be feeling its way forward in relation to its major challenges. 
 
A New White Paper on Defence 
The first challenge takes practical shape in the government’s promise to produce a new 
White Paper on Defence. The last one was issued in 2000, and considerable water has 
flowed under the bridge since them (indeed, even more has changed since 1996, when 
Labor was last in power). The former Coalition government, led by John Howard, was 
reluctant to attempt a grand rewriting of Australian strategy in the post 9/11 world, and 
instead embarked upon a series of ‘Defence Updates’ (in 2003, 2005 and 2007) and 
policy speeches to explain its own re-positioning of Australian strategy during that time. 
The Updates became the small siblings of the traditional White Papers; somewhat akin to 
earlier Strategic Reviews, they allowed the government to put down some markers about 
a shifting security environment and a new set of pressures on the Australian Defence 
Force. 
 
Not too surprisingly, each of the Updates generated its own wave of controversy. The 
2003 Update, which attempted to re-position Australia in the wake of the 9/11 and Bali 
terrorist attacks, was broadly condemned by the supporters of the old Defence of 
Australia doctrine, who believed the document pulled Australian priorities away from 
defending Australia and its near approaches in order to fight small-scale and ephemeral 
wars –wars of choice, rather than wars of necessity– in distant parts of the globe. The 
2005 Update was seen by its critics as an advertisement for the Australian Army: 
launched by the Prime Minister at a major Army base, and in conjunction with a smaller 
pamphlet touting the virtues of a ‘Hardened and Networked Army’, the document 
undoubtedly reflected the government’s support for the service that was carrying the 
burden of Australian engagement in Iraq, Afghanistan and a number of South Pacific 
missions. 
 
The Howard government gradually became more confident about its own doctrinal 
position, and the 2007 Update represented a much more considered articulation of its 
position.3 It attracted support from a wide range of commentators, and was intended to be 
the final stepping stone to a new defence White Paper had the government been returned 
at the 2007 election. Now that broader task has fallen to the Labor government. So Labor 
needs, as a priority, to spell out its own vision of Australian strategic policy. That is a 
demanding task, and it is not yet clear that the new government thinks with one mind on 
the issue. 
 
So what can we expect from the new government? Clearly, we should expect a degree of 
re-orientation in strategic policy, in both a geographic and a thematic sense. The former 
Howard government was distinctly globalist in its views. The new Rudd government looks 
likely to be more regionalist in its emphasis, placing a higher level of commitment onto the 
broader Asia-Pacific region, and shunning some of Howard’s more ‘expeditionary’ 
policies. And thematically, we might expect a lower emphasis on the War on Terror. 
Defence traditionalists were never happy that terrorism was accorded such a degree of 
strategic prominence in the post-9/11 environment, and they will be trying to persuade the 
government that traditional inter-state threats should remain the bread-and-butter of 
defence responsibilities. 
                                                 
2 On this point, see Hugh White (2006), ‘Defence: The Graveyard of Political Ambition’. The Age, 24 January. 
3 Rod Lyon (2007), ‘Assessing the Defence Update 2007’, Policy Analysis (12), Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute, Canberra. 
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There is a burgeoning argument in Australia about the relative weightings to be accorded 
to traditional and non-traditional security threats –and the respective roles that Defence 
and other Government departments ought to play in relation to the different threats–. 
Interestingly, the new government also seems attracted to the idea of producing some 
kind of formal document on National Security, as a complement to the White Paper on 
Defence. National security is a much broader concept than defence, and would allow the 
government the opportunity to broaden its engagement across a range of security 
activities even as its defence priorities contract. The dimensions of the national security 
policy remain to be explored, but this also seems likely to be a field where contentious 
voices –and competing interests– will be raised. 
 
Those areas of national security that have direct implications for how we use our military 
forces will, of course, be especially contentious. And in lieu of other instruments, defence 
faces the prospect that its capabilities will increasingly be called upon to perform a range 
of more non-traditional missions. In short, the centrifugal forces of a broadening security 
agenda might well counter the centripetal effects of the government’s attempts to define 
defence’s responsibilities more narrowly. 
 
‘Operationalising’ the Strategy 
Of course, the second major challenge for the new government will be to address the 
issue of ‘operationalising’ its new declaratory strategic posture. Here the decisions that 
need to be made are just as big as those in strategic policy area and, moreover, they tend 
to have large dollar signs attached to them. Some voices will certainly be counselling the 
new Government that capability development needs to return more definitively to the 
guidance derived from the old Defence of Australia standard. That guidance included the 
need for Australia to maintain a ‘clear regional technological advantage’, and –in an age 
of quickening regional arms modernisation– that could be an expensive objective to 
pursue. 
 
Defence of Australia advocates were especially concerned by the effects that the shift in 
strategic priorities under the Coalition government seemed to be generating on 
procurement policies, as the government purchased a number of heavy Abrams tanks 
and invested in heavier sea- and air-lift capabilities, the better to allow the Australian 
Defence Force to operate on a sustained basis in distant theatres. So what might the new 
government do in this area? Here the evidence is more mixed. 
 
Professor Hugh White, Head of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the 
Australian National University, was formerly a ministerial staffer for both Kim Beazley, 
Minister for Defence under an earlier Labor government, and Bob Hawke, the Labor 
Prime Minister for the bulk of the 1980s. A fair indication of the advice that White is 
probably now counselling to the new Labor government can be sensed by skimming the 
newspaper columns that he wrote during the Howard years. Those columns contain a 
number of judgments, including: 
 
• That the Howard government had been misled into believing that terrorism posed an 
important strategic danger to Australia, when terrorism was merely a troubling but 
persistent nuisance which should not determine force structure. 
• That it had been misled into a series of unwise defence purchases. 
• That it had been misled by a fondness for the ANZAC (Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps) tradition and service lobbying into supporting the Australian Army as its 
dominant service, when the Army in fact offered relatively poor strategic ‘weight’ in 
Asia. 
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• That Australian high-technology naval and air assets offered much better strategic 
‘weight’ in the emerging regional security environment. 
• That the Howard government had been misled into thinking of the Navy and Air Force 
as support services for the Army, hence the decision to purchase air-warfare 
destroyers and large amphibious-lift vessels and C-17s. 
• That it had been misled into the development of large surface ships for the Navy when 
the future of sea power really lay with submarines. 
• That it had been misled into supporting the use of armed forces to promote Western 
values far from home, a mission that military forces were poorly equipped to fulfil. 
 
It is uncertain how much of this agenda will be picked up by the new Labor government. 
The Prime Minister has frequently suggested a broader view of Australia’s defence than 
the one outlined above. In a speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute on 8 
August 2007, for example, Rudd spoke of globalisation ‘changing Australia’s defence 
reality’. But the breadth of White’s criticisms of the Howard government’s policies scarcely 
squares with a Labor policy of ‘more of the same’. The new Defence Minister, Joel 
Fitzgibbon, has already signalled his commitment to a follow-on submarine force beyond 
the current Collins-class vessel. And the government has already signalled its 
determination to revisit current procurement projects, especially the contentious air-
combat capability requirements. Still, he has also indicated the new government’s support 
for the purchase of two large amphibious vessels and three air-warfare destroyers, 
decisions which were contentious when the Howard government first made them. 
 
Interestingly, one of White’s newspaper columns written before the appointment of 
Brendan Nelson as Defence Minister in early 2006, suggested the new minister should 
have two primary objectives: to produce a new defence White Paper and to drive defence 
to do business more efficiently. Both of those would appear to be early priorities for the 
new government, but both are difficult and demanding exercises. 
 
The Australia-US Relationship 
At least some of the government’s supporters will be hankering for a more moderated 
relationship with the US. Cosiness with Washington is the norm in Australian strategic 
policy, but the Howard government took the Australia-US relationship to a new level of 
intimacy, and some ‘rollback’ from that peak should be expected. In the broad context of 
foreign policy, the ALP has been arguing for some years for a three-pillared approach: (1) 
maintenance of the close alliance relationship with the US; (2) closer Asian engagement; 
and (3) a restoration of Australia’s multilateral diplomacy via the United Nations. This 
approach suggests the government will be attempting to place greater reliance on Asian 
engagement and multilateral efforts, the overall effect of which will be to dilute the fraction 
of effort devoted to the bilateral relationship with the US. 
 
But it is not merely an issue of fractions that we ought to be looking at here: Labor will 
want a different ‘quality’ to the relationship. Some evidence of that is already available in 
the new government’s willingness to move Australian effort in Iraq into more of the non-
military field, by an increase in aid monies. Rudd, of course, will be hopeful that some of 
the readjustment in relationship quality will occur as a natural result of the evolution of US 
politics, given the looming 2008 presidential election. The neo-conservative peak is now 
well past its prime in Washington, and there are already signs that the Bush 
Administration, in its final year, is trying to portray itself as more of an honest broker in the 
Middle East. Both the National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear weapons 
capabilities and Bush’s own recent trip to the Middle East can be seen as evidence of 
that. 
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A post-Bush Administration might well be trying to put a softer face on US global 
leadership, and that would suit well Rudd’s attempt to shift the Australia-US relationship to 
that same ground. Naturally, the Australian Labor government would probably feel a 
higher degree of political sympathy with a Democratic Administration rather than a 
Republican one, but the degree of bipartisanship within Australia for the US alliance is still 
such that any Australian government could work reasonably happily with any US one. 
Affinities between particular leaders can add a special icing to the cake of the bilateral 
relationship –the Bush-Howard relationship certainly did– but the cake is there anyway. 
No breach of the relationship between Canberra and Washington is in prospect. 
 
And while the government wants to position itself as the staunch defender of Australia’s 
right to say no to its main ally, when push comes to shove this is not an easy position to 
maintain. Whatever the logic of strategic theory might say about the importance of 
determining Australian priorities from geography, the practice of statecraft usually dictates 
otherwise. As Michael Evans has observed: ‘the truth is that, in times of conflict and crisis 
–from the two World Wars through Korea, Malaya, Borneo and Vietnam to East Timor in 
the 20th century to Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomons in the 21st century– the 
requirements of pragmatic statecraft have always demanded that Australia fight overseas. 
Moreover, despite a theoretical focus on air and sea forces, Australia’s practical 
commitment in times of war and crisis has usually involved a heavy dependence on 
troops for overseas service.’4 
 
Of course, the US is also likely to remain an important advocate of the idea that terrorism 
is a strategic worry for Western countries. So the ANZUS alliance will remain an important 
shaping influence upon Australian strategic policy in a number of ways. It will press a 
counter-terrorist agenda into Australian strategic thinking, solicit Australian contributions 
to distant theatres and influence those debates over where, when and why Australian 
forces ought to be deployed abroad. 
 
A Revival of Regionalism? 
Australian strategic policy has long been torn between competing imperatives. Three 
distinct ‘schools’ have emerged, each of which has argued for a prioritisation of a different 
geographic area. Globalists have insisted that Australian security depends primarily upon 
a benign, Western-shaped global order; regionalists have insisted that Australia can only 
be secure when it comes to terms with its geographical location in the broader Asian 
context; and continentalists have insisted that Australia must aim at the self-reliant 
defence of its own continent, without having to rely on the armed forces of any other 
nation in order to achieve that objective.5 
 
Within the ALP, the traditional thrust has been to rely on multilateral instruments and the 
relationship with the US to manage the global level, to build a specific set of relationships 
with Asian countries backstopped by the ANZUS alliance just in case events take a turn 
for the worse in the region, and to nurture a sense of independence and nationalist self-
reliance in relation to the continental level. Thus, a competent, proficient ADF has been 
seen as a mechanism for reducing Australia’s strategic reliance upon the US, and special 
efforts have been made over the years in order to build Canberra’s relationship with 
Jakarta (of which Paul Keating’s security agreement with the Indonesian President 
Suharto was only one manifestation). In recent years, Labor on the opposition benches in 
                                                 
4 Michael Evans, The Tyranny of Dissonance, p.42. 
5 For a fuller description of the schools and the different ways in which they think about Australia’s strategic 
needs see Rod Lyon (2007), Australia’s Strategic Fundamentals, Special Report (6), Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, Canberra. 
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Parliament has repeatedly attacked the Howard government for being too close to the US, 
and for allowing US global priorities to shape the way Australia thinks about its own 
defence needs. 
 
The repositioning of Australian strategic emphasis to the regional level will have one 
important ramification: it will automatically dilute the level of concentration on terrorism as 
a principal strategic threat. At the regional level, the issue of terrorism does have traction, 
but not nearly the same level of traction that it has at the global level, where it is the 
vehicle for an asymmetrical conflict between the global superpower and jihadist 
extremists. That conflict has special resonance in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and North Africa, and across a range of Western countries. It also has resonance in 
South-East Asian countries with substantial Islamic populations. But no part of Asia has 
genuinely emerged as a ‘second front’ in the War on Terror, despite fears in Washington 
in 2001 and 2002 that such a development might occur. 
 
Instead, Asian strategic worries tend to be focused on the traditional great-power 
relationships between the region’s emerging powers. China and India are both rising 
powers, and Japan, the region’s ‘status quo’ power, is starting to feel itself more 
strategically marginalised. The three countries have no history of being strong 
simultaneously, and no history of security cooperation with each other. They all need 
greater practice at jointly ‘managing’ the issues of regional security. Some want to create 
a new North-East Asian security structure –perhaps a follow-on structure to the Six-Party 
Talks– for that purpose. Others want Japan and India to become permanent members of 
the UN Security Council, but that change would be much harder to make. 
 
Conclusion: Australian strategy is likely to be the subject of debate and change under 
the Labor government. It will not just be a case of ‘more of the same’. It would be 
reasonable to expect a tighter redrawing of Australian strategic priorities, with an 
emphasis on regional issues, and some will be arguing vigorously for a return to Defence 
of Australia guidelines for force development. Broader issues will probably be hived off to 
a new Office of National Security, for a whole-of-government response. But there are a 
number of ‘known unknowns’ that might yet have a formative impact on Australian 
strategic thinking. One of those would be some future, large-scale terrorist attack on 
Australian territory. Another would be a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction 
on the US. Others would cover the possibility for heightened levels of regional conflict in 
Asia, indeed in the worst case some form of great-power clash. The Howard government 
found itself driven into new strategic terrain by global events; so too might the new Labor 
government. 
 
Rod Lyon 
Program Director (Strategy and International), Australian Strategic Policy Institute 
 
 
 
